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Abstract 
Penetration testers are required to attack systems to evaluate their security, but without 
engaging in unethical behaviour while doing so.  Despite work on hacker values and studies 
into security practice, there is little literature devoted to the ethical pressures associated with 
penetration testing.  This paper presents several ethical dilemmas and dimensions associated 
with penetration testing; these shed light on the ethical positions taken by penetration testers, 
and help identify potential fallacies and biases associated with each position. 
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1. Introduction 
Penetration testers attack systems to evaluate their security in the face of realistic 
threats.  These attacks take the form of authorised penetration tests that probe a 
system's defenses; these defenses are then breached to evaluate the impact of any 
weaknesses; the results of these tests are used to improve a system's security, making 
them resilient to further attacks.   
Hacking a system requires technical prowess, creativity, and ingenuity to find 
unexpected ways of appropriating it (Geer and Harthorne, 2002). Penetration testing 
requires all of this, with the added constraint that finding and exploiting 
vulnerabilities should neither harm the system nor encroach on the dignity of those 
affected by it.  Unfortunately, commercial pressures mean that penetration testers 
face pressure to discover insecurity without themselves engaging in unethical 
behaviour before, during, and after a penetration test.  For example, consider the 
following scenario: An investment bank is considering whether to enter a long-term 
contract for information assurance services with a security consultancy.  As a pilot 
project, the bank commissions the firm to evaluate whether a policy forbidding the 
plugging in of unauthorised USB devices into workstations is being adhered to.  The 
IT staff at the bank want the firm to adapt a known piece of banking malware that, 
when installed on a USB stick which is plugged into one of the bank's workstations, 
will email a selection of spreadsheet files on a shared working directory to an email 
account owned by the firm.  This simple test will help the bank evaluate who in the 
company is violating the policy. 
Such a test may be legal if the exfiltrated data was not personal, but this legality may 
be questionable depending on the legal jurisdiction where the test takes place.  There 
are also question marks about the morality associated with employing malware, and 
engaging with markets where the malware is acquired might also have ethical 
implications based on the nature of the exploit or the system under evaluation 
(Egelman et al., 2013).  Finally, is the use of deception and de-anonymisation of 
employees acceptable, particularly where a policy is intentionally violated to achieve 
critical productivity goals (Adams and Sasse, 1999)? 
Previous work (Chiesa et al., 2009; Holt, 2010) has started to glean an understanding 
of hacker values, but has focused on hackers trying to compromise systems, rather 
than 'ethical' hackers trying to protect them.  These studies indicate that the morality 
of many hacker's actions, and whether or not they exceed the ethical parameters of a 
given situation, varies based on mood or other factors.  Although there have been 
studies of different types of security practitioners (Haber and Bailey, 2007; 
Werlinger et al., 2009), the social and ethical challenges faced by penetration testers 
remains an unexplored area.  A better understanding of these challenges might 
provide directions for improving the techniques and tools used to penetration test 
systems. 
In this paper, we present several ethical dilemmas and dimensions faced by 
penetration testers; these shed light on how penetration testers value the role of 
ethics, justify ethical decisions, and shape perceptions around their clients and 
practices.  We consider the relationship between ethics and penetration testing in 
Section 2 before describing our approach in Section 3.  We present the ethical 
dilemmas and dimensions found in Section 4, and illustrate its use in unpacking 
fallacies and biases, before concluding in Section 5. 
 
2. Ethics and Penetration Testing 
Ethics is the study of morality (Tavani, 2006).  By providing principles and theories 
about different viewpoints about what is meant to be 'right', ethics helps classify 
arguments, defend a position or better understand the position others take and, in 
doing so, helps determine an appropriate course of action.  Penetration testing 
vivifies ethics, forcing practitioners to think about the consequences of a variety of 
situations, ranging from agreeing the parameters of a test, to deciding which 
techniques should or should not be allowed during a test (Bishop, 2007).  
Unfortunately, as the previous section illustrated, many dilemmas are more 
sophisticated and fall within a grey area where a response may be legal, but 
potentially unethical.  While the necessity to attend to ethical considerations is 
broadly accepted, guidance on how to do so is not.  For example, the Open Source 
Security Testing Methodology Manual (OSSTM) states that, when evaluating the 
security posture of a target, “business and industry ethics policies” that influence 
security and privacy requirements should be identified (Hertzog, 2010).  However, 
the objective of undertaking such a review is to scope any testing activity and 
identify vulnerabilities that might lead to inappropriate disclosure of private 
information.  OSSTM puts emphasis on what should be evaluated rather than the 
techniques used to carry out an evaluation; it is non-prescriptive about how such 
policies should be identified and analysed. 
Although some of the ethical implications of hacking are understood (Spafford, 
1992), the implications of ethical hacking are comparatively ill-explored.  Moreover, 
while the role of ethics is discussed in computing degree courses, there are 
inconsistent options in what should be taught to students to prepare them for their 
professional careers (Hall, 2014).  Consequently, professional penetration testers 
inevitably fall back on professional codes to provide advice on their conduct; such 
codes need to be broad enough to cover ethical conflicts and concerns, yet specific 
enough to guide decision-making in actual situations (Perlman and Varma, 2002).  
There have been several examples of the security community drawing up such codes 
for ethical hackers.  For example, the Council of Registered Ethical Security Testers 
(CREST) provides their members with a code of conduct (CREST, 2014).  This code 
not only stipulates a code of ethics, but is also an aide-memoire for good practice; 
these include the need to evaluate the impact of new techniques and tools, and 
requirements to explain project deliverables to clients, and keep up to date with new 
standards and regulations.  However, such codes are often framed as constraints and 
rules rather than providing specific guidance.  Not only do such codes give the false 
impression that locating and following a directive is both necessary and sufficient to 
behave ethically, they also fail to provide advice on how to deal with conflicts of 
ethical significance (Ladd, 1985).   
Penetration testers are expected to make informed decisions based on their 
understanding of the situation at hand, supported by any procedural, ethical, and 
technical training they may have undertaken (Xynos et al., 2010).  Although there is 
a plethora of books and events that provide technical training, there is little to 
describe the form that ethical training might take.  Moreover, Xynos and his 
colleagues claim that ambiguity associated with penetration testing practices raise a 
number of other questions about how penetration testers demonstrate 
professionalism, how clients can be confident that a penetration testing team can be 
trusted to complete their assignment, and their work is fit for purpose? 
(Pierce et al., 2006) have proposed a conceptual model of penetration testing ethics, 
which is centered on the role of integrity.  It considers the avoidance of conflicts of 
interest, false positives and negatives, and binding ethical and legal agreements 
influences professional integrity, which, in turn, helps protect the interests of clients 
and the security profession in general.  This model is grounded in technical literature 
of penetration testing, and codes of practice, which encompass it.  The role of the 
model purports to provide guidelines for what it means for ethical hackers to behave 
ethically.  The issues at stake are, however, greyer than suggested by this framework.  
For example, Pierce et al. claim that if penetration testers refuse to engage with 
criminal hackers then they are using their skills only for commissioned tests and are 
upholding the profession.  However, there are numerous ways that penetration testers 
might fail to uphold the profession.  Moreover, the framework implies that behaving 
legally is synonymous with behaving ethically.  This fails to recognise scenarios of 
legal ambiguity; penetration testers must unpack these to determine the right thing to 
do. 
 
3. Approach 
To understand the relationship between penetration testing and ethics, we 
interviewed eight professional penetration testers.  While largely unstructured, the 
interviews sought responses to some of the questions raised by the related work 
(Pierce et al., 2006; Xynos et al., 2010; CREST, 2014).  These were structured 
around the following four areas. 
• Responsibilities: What are your professional responsibilities, and how do you 
ensure you that you and your team behave responsibly? 
• Practices: How do you assess the legal and ethical import of your everyday 
practice? 
• Ethics: What ethical codes of practice do you rely on, and how do you resolve 
any ethical dilemmas you might face? 
• Assurance: What assurances do you provide of your professionalism, and how 
can clients be confident that you can be trusted to complete your engagement?  
To ensure a consistent level of professional expertise, all interviewees either held 
qualifications awarded by CREST, or an equivalent qualification recognised by the 
UK government's CHECK scheme (CESG, 2014).  Interviewees either worked for 
security practices recognised as CREST member companies or, in some cases, UK 
government teams with a responsibility for penetrating government systems and 
installations.  During the interviews, interviewees were encouraged to talk about 
their own experiences carrying out penetration tests.  Given the broadness of the term 
`penetration test' these ranged from office-based white and black box evaluations of 
a client's product, through to open-scope `red team' tests.  Client confidentiality and 
lack of security clearance made it difficult for interviewees to talk precisely about 
specific examples.  In such cases, interviewees were presented with hypothetical 
ethical dilemmas (similar to that presented in Section 1) and asked to describe how 
they would address them. 
Each interview took place at the workplace of the interviewees, and each interview 
lasted between 45 minutes to an hour.  Transcripts from the interviews were subject 
to open and axial coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).  From this coding exercise, 34 
refined thematic concepts were identified, together with 34 relationships between 
these concepts.  From this emerging model, a set of propositions was written that 
summarised each of the 34 conceptual relationships.  These propositions were 
written on post-it notes, and subject to affinity diagramming to identify themed 
groupings of categories. 
4. Results 
4.1. Dilemmas 
While the interviewees claimed they rarely faced moral dilemmas, we found 
evidence of two forms of dilemma faced by penetration testers.  The first dilemma 
concerned managing penetration testing clients, and the tension between doing the 
right thing for the client company (the whole), and the right thing for its staff (the 
individual).  While it was generally accepted that any form of activity that involved 
deception risks breaking the trust between the company and its staff, some 
interviewees believed that a company's security policy justified the use of human 
testing, irrespective of the legality or morality of the policy itself.  The second 
dilemma concerned managing testing practices, and the tension between choosing a 
structured and carefully considered strategy (structured), over a strategy that was 
unstructured and contingent (unstructured).  The former approach entails structuring 
an engagement such that ethical concerns are designed out.  However, if the scope of 
a test expands or emergent technology is evaluated, there is a need to be more 
creative, and less bound by convention.  
Based on the affinity diagramming exercise, we found two clusters of thematic 
concepts.  One cluster corresponded with penetration testing behaviour that resolved 
these dilemmas by taking an individual/unstructured position (IU); the other cluster 
corresponded with a whole/structured position (WS).  Both positions are not 
mutually exclusive, and we do not consider any position more virtuous than the 
other.  
4.2. Dimensions 
On considering the themes associated with the IU and WS positions, we found the 
following four additional groupings of category; these groupings provide insight into 
how penetration testers holding each position reflect on different concerns of ethical 
import.  We consider these issues as ethical dimensions (Figure 1), and define these 
as follows: 
• Value of ethics: the value penetration testers see in ethics. 
• Ethical appeal: the means used by penetration testers to establish the credibility 
of their ethical position. 
• Client focus: the emphasis placed on responsibly managing clients. 
• Practice focus: the emphasis placed on providing assurance about penetration 
testing practices. 
Dimension 
Dilemma Positions 
Individual / Unstructured 
(IU) 
Whole / Structured  
(WS) 
Value of ethics Interpersonal skills Legal sense 
Ethical appeal Common sense Contingency 
Client focus Individual Collective 
Practice focus Data and tool assurance Information management 
Figure 1: Perspectives adopted by dilemma positions for each dimension 
4.2.1. Value of Ethics 
For most interviewees, being ethical marked them out as professionals.   For 
example, one interviewee (I4) observed: “We all have to adhere to the CREST code 
of ethics, so we all rigorously adhere to that. I think I always go with the mentality 
that if the client is happy with what you're doing then you're along the right lines.  
Whenever I try and make a decision, you need to justify whether or not it's going to 
be beneficial for the client.”  For this reason, some interviewees stated that either 
they or their companies would avoid testing activities, such as social engineering, for 
fear that these might be easily construed as unethical.  Such activities not only 
jeopardise the well being of deceived clients, but also their career should problems 
occurred during testing.  In some cases, however, such testing was deemed 
acceptable when undertaken as part of a `red team' test that evaluates a client's 
broader security posture. 
In considering the more specific value of ethics taken by each position, we noted that 
the IU position considered ethics as a learned, interpersonal skill.  When faced with a 
dilemma, juniors may defer responsibility for tackling ethical hazards to seniors or 
even their client.  However, it is unclear who would be in the best position to tackle 
the dilemma. While the less senior tester has the most contextual knowledge, they 
may not necessarily know who is best placed to deal with it. The WS position of 
ethics is that of a vehicle for legality, and a means for honing legal senses.  This 
standpoint claims that legal and moral issues are treated as one and the same, and 
that debate takes place in teams when moral issues are found.  Testers subscribing to 
this perspective eschew anything morally ambiguous because it is understood that 
legal nuances are difficult to unpack.   
4.2.2. Ethical appeal 
Most interviewees claimed that the appeal used to resolve ethical issues was 
situational in some way, or – as characterized by I2 – “ The more you test, the more 
you get a sense of what is risky to do.”   
The justification taken by those adopting an IU position is that being ethical is 
'common sense'.  One interviewee claimed that the ease with which the law can be 
broken, and the implications to their career of breaking the law keeps testers honest.  
Junior penetration testers hone their penetration testing 'common sense' by 
shadowing more senior testers to understand how adopting an adversarial perspective 
can identify what would be hitherto ignored vulnerabilities.  While the primary 
purpose of such shadowing is to glean an understanding of the technical detail of 
penetration testing, junior testers develop their understanding of professional 
penetration testing in the process. The justification taken by those taking a WS 
position is that being ethical means appealing to contingency and putting any ethical 
dilemma in context.  By placing any prospective ethical issue in context, the risks 
associated with it become obvious when the right questions are asked at the right 
time; this ability to identify and address risks in context is developed as testers 
become more experienced. 
4.2.3. Client focus 
While no interviewees were asked to carry out activities that breached the UK 
Computer Misuse Act, some interviewees had been asked to consider engaging in 
activities that might have been in breach of Article 8 of the Human Rights Act.  As 
such, interviewees were mindful of the need to do the right thing for the client with 
respect to their own legal and moral obligations.  For example, I3 notes: “the major 
thing for us is to always remember why you're there, and keep within that scope so 
not to go and explore the network for the sake of exploring the network.  We're not 
there to read people's emails and that kind of thing.” 
The IU position is shaped by the need to reactively manage individual contacts 
within the client organisation.  While few interviewees reported active hostility 
towards them, conflict between penetration testing “red” teams and client 
infrastructure “blue” teams was not uncommon, particularly in companies where the 
managerial contact was inexperienced or lack credibility within their organisation.  
For example, one interviewee stated that, when testing web apps at a client site, any 
unavailability of the web app would typically be blamed on the testers.  In other 
cases, conflict arose as a response to some form of criticism, be this in the design of 
software or the infrastructure.  The WS position is shaped by the duty to provide 
value to the client organisation as a whole.  This includes keeping the organisation 
appraised throughout a penetration test, implicitly educating clients about the value 
of penetration tests, and collaborating in such a way that clients are well placed to fix 
any problems identified once a final report is delivered.  In some cases, this 
obligation is so strong that some testers addressed dilemmas by focusing initially on 
the impact to the client, rather than by starting to consider the social and technical 
implications of the dilemma first.  Some interviewees felt obliged to proactively 
address potential conflict.  For example, one interviewee described how he would 
engage client staff by encouraging them to raise problems with him in such a way 
that, when highlighted in the final report, recommendations could be stated that 
address them.   
4.2.4. Practice focus 
The interviewees unanimously cared about their security practices, and the 
perceptions people hold about penetration testers.  They believed that their 
association with a professional body, such as CREST, provided some assurance that 
their work practices are trustworthy.  For example, I4 expressed concern that bad 
practice or low standards potentially undermine their entire industry: “you have to 
adhere to all of your ethical guidance and you need to ... if you find those 
vulnerabilities you need to tell them about them immediately.  As security experts, we 
have to do that otherwise the security industry as a whole... there wouldn't be any 
faith in it, or any trust.” 
The responsibility to penetration testing practice is manifest by the IU and WS 
positions in different ways.  The IU position is concerned with providing assurance 
about both the tools used, and any findings resulting from tool usage.  Several 
interviewees noted that research into a potential tool's provenance was strongly 
encouraged by their firms, and internal training courses and seminars are used to 
share knowledge team members had discovered about new tools. Although some 
interviewees noted that job interview questions touched upon ethical practice, it was 
acknowledged that little staff development time was spent on what was described as 
'soft consultancy stuff' like ethics.  The WS position is shaped by the need to provide 
assurance about how information is managed.  This position focuses on the integrity 
of information managed and delivered to the client.  While this integrity is a product 
of the tools used to provide input into the report, referring to raw data and logs was 
considered as something only required as a last resort.  Those adopting this position 
believe that factual information should always be defended, and evidence from 
different sources is sanitised before use.  This level of assurance allays any 
apprehension that clients might have about what a penetration testing team has been 
doing.  
4.3. Using the model to unpack fallacies and biases 
By creating a model of ethical dilemmas and dimensions, it becomes possible to spot 
fallacies resulting from each position.  For example, within the IU position, it is 
acknowledged that adopting an adversarial perspective, and shadowing more senior 
colleagues can hone the senses of more junior penetration testers.  However, it is a 
fallacy to assume that ethical behaviour will always follow in such a situation.  If the 
more senior colleague’s behaviour is morally ambiguous then a junior tester may not 
appreciate that practices gleaned are equally ambiguous.  Moreover, when adopting 
an adversarial and unstructured position then there is also a danger that behaviour 
that seems common sense may become legally ambiguous as well. 
Potential biases are also evident when considering tensions between concepts.  
Within the WS position, educating the client about penetration testing is important, 
as is the need for clients to accept responsibility for remedying any problems found.  
When a report has been delivered to the client, positive feedback and the lack of 
further correspondence may indicate that the report has been accepted and its 
recommendations actioned.  It is, however, equally possible that the client may have 
sought the test only to obtain some form of accreditation, and may action few of the 
recommendations made.  Should testers believe the report is being actioned then they 
may be subject to the fundamental attribution bias; this refers to the tendency of 
people to ignore possible external causes of the behaviour of others and to assume 
that their behaviour is a reflection of internal dispositions (Gilbert and Malone, 
1995). As such, testers may underestimate how the role of external constraints and 
requirements shape the behaviour of those around them, and in turn overestimate 
how much their actions are determined by their personality, values and beliefs.  This 
bias is also evident by the tendency of testers to assume that they are in fact better at 
understanding the importance of external factors in the behaviour of others than their 
peers (van Boven et al., 2003).   
5. Conclusion 
This paper has presented several ethical dilemmas and dimensions faced by 
penetration testers.  In doing so, we have made two contributions.  First, we have 
shown how the differences associated with the dilemmas identified are manifest 
across different ethical dilemmas.  Second, we have briefly illustrated how both these 
differences and the model can be used to unpack possible fallacies and biases that 
affect ethical decision making before, during, or after a penetration test.  A limitation 
of this work is that only UK practitioners were interviewed.  However, given the 
experience level of the testers, there is little reason to assume these results do not 
scale when considering other testers with an equivalent level of professional 
experience, particularly those that engage with other professional bodies.   
6. Acknowledgements 
The research described in this paper was funded by the Bournemouth University FIF 
project Bournemouth European Network in Cyber Security. 
7. References 
Adams, A. and Sasse, M. A. (1999). Users are not the enemy. Communications of the ACM, 
42:41–46.  
Bishop, M. (2007). About penetration testing. Security & Privacy, IEEE, 5(6):84– 87.  
van Boven, L., White, K., Kamada, A., and Gilovich, T. (2003). Intuitions about situational 
correction in self and others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(2):249–258.  
CESG (2014). What is CHECK?  Available from http://www.cesg.gov.uk 
Chiesa, R., Ducci, S., and Ciappi, S. (2009). Profiling hackers: the science of criminal 
profiling as applied to the world of hacking. Auerbach Publications.  
Corbin, J. M. and Strauss, A. L. (2008). Basics of qualitative research: techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory. Sage Publications, Inc., 3rd edition.  
CREST (2014). Code of Conduct for CREST Qualified Individuals. Available from 
http://www.crest-approved.org 
Egelman, S., Herley, C., and van Oorschot, P. C. (2013). Markets for zero-day exploits: Ethics 
and implications. In Proceedings of the 2013 Workshop on New Security Paradigms 
Workshop, NSPW ’13, pages 41–46. ACM.  
Geer, D. and Harthorne, J. (2002). Penetration testing: a duet. In Computer Security 
Applications Conference, 2002. Proceedings. 18th Annual, pages 185– 195.  
Gilbert, D. T. and Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence bias. Psychological Bulletin, 
117(1):21–38.  
Haber, E. M. and Bailey, J. (2007). Design guidelines for system administration tools 
developed through ethnographic field studies. In Proceedings of the 2007 symposium on 
Computer human interaction for the management of information technology, CHIMIT ’07. 
ACM.  
Hall, B. R. (2014). A synthesized definition of computer ethics. SIGCAS Comput. Soc., 
44(3):21–35.  
Hertzog, P. (2010). OSSTMM 3 - The Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual. 
ISECOM.  
Holt, T. (2010). Examining the role of technology in the formation of deviant subcultures. 
Social Science Computer Review, 28(4):466–481.  
Ladd, J. (1985). The quest for a code of professional ethics: An intellectual and moral 
confusion. In Johnson, D. G. and Snapper, J. W., editors, Ethical Issues in the Use of 
Computers, pages 8–13. Wadsworth Publ. Co.  
Perlman, B. and Varma, R. (2002). Improving ethical engineering practice. Technology and 
Society Magazine, IEEE, 21(1):40–47.  
Pierce, J., Jones, A., and Warren, M. (2006). Penetration testing professional ethics: a 
conceptual model and taxonomy. Australasian Journal of Information Systems, 13(2):193–
200.  
Spafford, E. H. (1992). Are computer hacker break-ins ethical? Journal of Systems and 
Software, 17(1):41–47.  
Tavani, H. T. (2006). Ethics and Technology: Ethical Issues in an Age of Information and 
Communication Technology. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY, USA.  
Werlinger, R., Hawkey, K., Botta, D., and Beznosov, K. (2009). Security practitioners in 
context: Their activities and interactions with other stakeholders within organizations. 
International Journal of Human Computer Studies, 67(7):584–606.  
Xynos, K., Sutherland, I., Read, H., Everitt, E., and Blyth, A. J. C. (2010). Penetration Testing 
and Vulnerability Assessments: A Professional Approach. In Proceedings of the 1st 
International Cyber Resilience Conference, pages 126–132.  
